

## Review Article

### The Boko Haram Regime in Borno: An Assessment of its Socio-Political Effects, 2009-2017

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#### Article History

Received: 04.02.2019

Accepted: 11.05.2019

Published: 01.08.2019

#### Journal homepage:

<https://www.easpublisher.com/sjh>

#### Quick Response Code



**Abstract:** The Boko Haram insurgency, which started in 2009, has devastating consequences, not only on Borno the main theater of the conflict, the northeast geo-political zone and the entire Nigerian landscape, but it also has serious impact on the entire Chad-Basin region. When it started as a mere defiance of the internal security operatives, the Boko Haram insurgency became a phenomenon. When they gradually but firmly established their hegemony in more than 20 of the 27 Local Government Areas of Borno State with attendant devastating havoc, whose operations and consequences permeated throughout the northeast zone. The magnitude of the devastation could only be compared with the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. In 2017, the Nigerian Government had officially announced the defeat of the insurgents, as all territories hitherto under their control were recovered, and when “Camp Zairo or Camp Zero” in the dreaded “Sambisa Forest”, the impregnable base of the insurgents had fallen to the superior fire power of the Nigerian Army. Being a contemporary historical phenomenon, the Boko Haram phenomenon and its consequences in Nigeria need to be documented for both research and posterity. This fits in properly with the view of Thucydides who advocated that people should write on events or histories of their time. For this reason, this paper examines the socio-political consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Borno in many fronts, viz: religious, education, cultural practices, demography, inter-group relations, governance as well as the military. A historical method of using primary and secondary data is adopted in assessing the socio-political aftermath of Boko Haram insurgency on Borno.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, insurgency, aftermath, social and political

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#### Introduction

On 7<sup>th</sup> July, 2009, the Boko Haram fighters unveiled their disastrous campaign in Borno. Since then, the people of Borno and indeed the entire northeast region of Nigeria continued to experience tragic experiences. Many scholars and critical observers of events in the country have put forward a number of reasons which profiled the emergence of the insurgency. It could be that religious doctrine, pervasive poverty affecting the people, general disenchantment over Western education and or civilization, relegation of Islamic scholars to the background and undue preference of western scholarship for employment and recognition for appointments. On the other hand also, it might be hues and cries over undue disequilibrium between graduates of Western education and those of Islamic education, quest for leadership among the top actors of Boko Haram sect, lack of western education and exposure among the insurgents.

These reasons provided a fertile ground for the sect members to mobilise themselves and wage war against

the Nigerian State with the view to establishing their own caliphate. They anchored their campaign on the precept of doctrine and explicitly categorized the people into two; i.e. those who embraced their tenets of belief belong to the abode of “Halal and paradise” and the opposition to this belongs to the abode of “Haram or Kuffur and the Hellfire”. With this philosophy, they mounted a campaign against the society.

Boko Haram campaign was schemed dastardly by targeting security agents and their collaborators, government and political party officials such as cabinet officials, civil servants, school teachers, party stalwarts, business class and traders, Islamic scholars and Boko Haram members who are opposed to the campaign were not spared. Apart from the barbaric killing of their victims, the campaign also caused wanton destruction of public and private properties such as schools, hospitals, police stations, army and police barracks, government residential areas, markets and business places, destruction of transportation systems and communication networks. The net result of these

drawbacks ensued abject poverty and pauperization in the society. However, the campaign further disarticulated communal and societal inter personal relationship thereby creating suspicion and mistrust among families and communities.

#### **Political Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency**

The Boko Haram insurgency no doubt has serious devastating political consequences that even permeated beyond the state, northeast region, Nigeria but to the international outlook. The insurgency has catastrophically affected key political areas of administration and policies in the state. Both modern and traditional political institutions were affected in Borno in that key players became casualties. Politically, the insurgency had affected voting pattern in the 2011 and 2015 general elections. The insurgency also propelled the Nigerian armed forces and other security operatives to brace-up in their responsibilities to protect the nation from internal and external aggressions by adopting new strategies and tactics.

#### **Political Overview of the Situation in Borno:**

Politically, Borno witnessed unprecedented upheavals in the hands of the Boko Haram from 2009 to 2017. Both modern and traditional political institutions suffered. The insurgents as a cardinal policy designed to wipe out political structures in all its ramifications. What informed this was their desire to establish a caliphate to replace the existing political system. Traditional political institutions in Borno were most hit by the insurgents. According to Shehu of Borno, "...with the exception of the Emir of Biu, virtually all the traditional rulers are taking refuge in Maiduguri due to the insurgency that bedeviled Borno".<sup>1</sup> The insurgents went to the extent of not only wiping out the subordinate chiefs but also threatened their sovereignty. During this period particularly at the heat of the Boko Haram insurgency between 2012 and 2013, several subordinate traditional rulers which include Ward Heads, Village Heads, District Heads were killed.<sup>2</sup> This development rattled the Shehu of Borno and his court where all the existing wards, village and district heads had to relocate to Maiduguri and become IDP's. In the words of Matawalli, the Shettima Kanuribe of Borno, "The bunch of lunatic i.e. Boko Haram caused mayhem on our authorities and thereby embattled us. Hence, many of our colleagues were contemplating to abdicate their thrones for safety".<sup>3</sup>

Worst still, the insurgents succeeded in ransacking several chiefdoms in Borno between 2014 and 2015.

<sup>1</sup> Shehu of Borno, HRH Alhaji Dr Abubakar Umar Garbai El-Kanemi, 62, in his palace on 27/12/2016

<sup>2</sup> Shehu of Borno...

<sup>3</sup> Matawalli Shettima Matawalli, 55, the Shettima Kanuribe of Borno and the District Head of Gwange at Kashim Ibrahim College of Education, Maiduguri on 25/01/2018.

The cases in point were the attacks on Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza and Askira/Uba emirates. All the Emirs in these emirates were forced to abdicate their thrones and consequently took to their heels. In the process, the Emir of Gwoza, Alhaji Shehu Idrissa Timta lost his life. The exit of these rulers from their domains created a serious vacuum which provided fertile grounds for some of the top echelons of the Boko Haram sect to claim the over-lordship of the emirates. For instance, Dikwa was prominently taken over by one Gamargu minor, Yaga as head, so also Gwoza which at different times fell under different sect leaders.<sup>4</sup> This scenario was similar to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century Borno under the Sayfawa when the Fulani jihadists under Gwoni Mukhtar stormed Borno's capital, Birni Ngazargamo and forced the ruling Mai of the time, Mai Ahmad bn. Ali to flee.<sup>5</sup> Describing this circumstance, Brenner says "the once mighty kingdom was in the state of chaos and on the brink of collapse".<sup>6</sup> To this end, therefore, it is not out of place to apply same to the events that followed the ouster of the traditional rulers from their areas of jurisdiction as a result of the Boko Haram pressure. It seems there was no effort on the part of these traditional rulers to prevent the aggression. Is it safer to say that the traditional military has vanished? What went wrong with the Kaigamas? How is it possible to say that they can prevent future occurrences of such menace? Side by side with the killing of traditional rulers, there were also the extermination of their courtiers and palace officials.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, modern political set-up was also obstructed. In terms of losses and attacks, political classes were among the soft targets of the insurgents. A cabinet member, Commissioner for Justice, Alhaji Zanna Malam Gana, the Borno State Commissioner of Justice was killed on 17<sup>th</sup> September, 2012 in Bama.<sup>8</sup> His killing sent a wave of jittery and traumatised into the lives of other officials of the state government.

<sup>4</sup> Ali Lawan Musa, 35, the village head of Gava, we were made to understand that Gwoza Local Government Area under the leadership of the Boko Haram was fragmented. According to him, one Ibrahim Tangaleke took charge of Dughwade-Kuranabasa axis and latter by Adamu Rugurugu. Yakubu Musa controlled Ngoshe axis while Bula Yaga was in charge of Izge and the surrounding environs. Despite being the headquarters of the short-lived caliphate, none of our informants was able to tell us who was the caliph.

<sup>5</sup> Louis Brenner, *The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty of Borno*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 39. See also Ronald Cohen, *The Kanuri of Borno*, New York: Reinhart and Winston, 1967, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Brenner, *The Shehus...*, p. 39.

<sup>7</sup> Shehu of Borno...

<sup>8</sup> Alhaji Modu Mbusube, 46, at Miri, Jere Local Government Area on 22/2/2018.

Thus, government officials stopped using official vehicles and started residing in highly secured areas in addition to restricting their movements. Some of the officials who lost their lives to the Boko Haram insurgency include the ANPP gubernatorial flag bearer for 2011 general election, Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio, the Chairman, Jere Local Government Council, Alhaji Mustapha Ba'ale, Chairman of Damboa Local Government Council, Dr Lawan Kawu and two former chairmen of Kukawa Local Government, Alhaji Bukar Abatcha and Alhaji Lawan Yarayi respectively to mention but a few. In the same vein, Borno State House of Assembly member representing Konduga Local Government Area, Alhaji Modu Bintube was killed by the Boko Haram in 2011. In addition to the above mentioned, Alhaji Kadiri Kazaa, a former commissioner was killed in 2013 and several councilors too numerous to mention across the state could not escape the menace of the Boko Haram insurgents.

By the middle of the 2013 to 2014, the situation in Borno became so tensed which attracted decisive military solution by the Federal Government.<sup>9</sup> Most people from the Local Government Areas started trooping into Maiduguri metropolis, some parts of Konduga and Jere to escape the treachery of Boko Haram insurgents. At that time, Maiduguri Metropolis, some parts of Konduga and Jere were enjoying relative peace in the state. As such, people felt that the areas mentioned afore were the safest heaven.

The Federal Government of Nigeria declared "partial state of emergency" on 14<sup>th</sup> May, 2013 on Borno to deal with the insurgency. Consequent upon this was the imposition of curfew in major cities of Borno for varying durations. During the partial state of emergency, the military enunciated different operational terms and code names to counter the lingering issue in the state and the northeast region as a whole.<sup>10</sup> For instance, in 2009, the police action code named "Operation Flush I and II" were lunched. It was followed by "Operation Restore Order" also in 2009. As

<sup>9</sup>The Executive Governor of Borno State remained on seat during the partial state of emergency but the security matters were handled by the military in conjunction with the state government. In essence, the state of emergency was termed partial in that it was not akin to the one imposed on Plateau State that ousted Governor Joshua Dariye during the Obasanjo 1999 administration.

<sup>10</sup>For details see Saliba B. James, "Operation Lafiya Dole and the Reclaiming of Peace in the Northeast: An Analysis of Effective Military Leadership Lt. General TY Buratai", In: A. M. Ashafa and Hussaini Jibrin (ed.) *The Nigerian Army in a Democracy Since 1999: A Professional Demonstration of Military Subordination to Civil Authority, Essays in honour of Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai*, Pyla-Mak Services Ltd., 2017, P. p.

part of the efforts to fish out the insurgents hiding in the metropolis, the security operatives adopted cordon and search tactics, check points were mounted and house-to-house search were carried out in different areas.<sup>11</sup> At a stage, the military virtually declared war on everybody for what they termed "the attackers were faceless". Hence, both the so-called attackers and the innocent civilian populace were molested, maimed and killed indiscriminately.<sup>12</sup> In addition, houses were burgled at will and properties destroyed. People became apprehensive over the ability of the security men to safeguard lives and properties. Public outcry for the withdrawal of soldiers in the metropolis became intensified. This position was echoed by Committee of Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought. In a statement on 12<sup>th</sup> July, 2011, this powerful body called for "immediate withdrawal of soldiers from the streets".

They complained of the following;

- i. .... the presence of thousands of weapons.... brandishing soldiers on the streets of Maiduguri has turned the situation into a nightmare, the worst Maiduguri has ever seen.
- ii. Many communities have been sacked and people in their thousands, are fleeing Maiduguri and the level of human suffering in Maiduguri has reached its peak and Borno is faced with horrific and horrendous humanitarian crisis.
- iii. Expectations of the military interventions in Borno state were "grossly misplaced and shattered".<sup>13</sup>

However, in countering this opinion, a number of people with a powerful rejectionist position on withdrawal of soldiers added their voice. This includes Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State who on 16<sup>th</sup> July, 2011, termed the withdrawal call "illegal". He observed that; "with no intention to denigrate not question the motives of the eminent persons agitating for the withdrawal of soldiers from the state, I regret to note that none has offered a tangible yet sustainable alternative to fill the security vacuum to be created in the event of the withdrawal of the Joint Task Force".<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup>See Abdullahi Garba, "The Role of Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) in Restoring Peace In Borno State, 2013-2016", In A. M. Ashafa and Hussaini Jibrin, *The Nigerian Army...P. p.*

<sup>12</sup>See Freedom Onuoha, "Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria", In: M. P. Monteclos (ed.), *Boko Haram; Islamism, Politics, Society and the State in Nigeria*, Africa Study Centre (ASC) Netherlands, *West Africa Politics and Security Series*, Vol. 2, 2014, P. p. 158-191.

<sup>13</sup>Tekena N. Tamuno, *Stakeholders at war in Nigeria from Lugard to President Goodluck Jonathan*, Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Limited, 2012, p. 158.

<sup>14</sup>Tamuno, *Stakeholders at...p. 158.*

A little earlier on, on 13<sup>th</sup> July, 2011, General (rtd.) Azazi, the National Security Adviser, had also said that, "Removal of Soldiers" from Borno State was not the solution of the Boko Haram threat to national security".<sup>15</sup>

**Counter Insurgency Efforts:** Military strategic and tactical plans were affected as a result of the sudden outburst of Boko Haram insurgency. The military witnessed the expansion and modernization of its command structure and operational guidelines. The outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast coupled with the lingering crisis in the country especially in the Niger Delta precipitated the military to expand the structure of the Nigerian Army. For the exigencies of Borno situation, two divisions were created in August, 2013.<sup>16</sup> These two additional Divisions include 7 Div and 8<sup>th</sup> Task Force Division. 7 Div has its base in Maiduguri while 8<sup>th</sup> Task Force Division is stationed at Monguno.<sup>17</sup> Side by side, there were elevations in military formations. Brigades and Battalions were created in different areas so as to effectively counter the insurgency.<sup>18</sup> As a result of the insurgency, the military became emboldened and got a sense of "Baptism of fire". Thus, to counter the insurgency effectively, they had to be awakened and decisively deal with the situation. Series of operational strategies were outlined starting with Operation Flush I and II in 2009 and Operation Restore Order also in the same year, Operation Zaman Lafiya between 2012 and 2015 and Operation Lafiya Dole which started in the mid 2015 to date with sub-operations under it.<sup>19</sup> The current Operation Lafiya Dole in conjunction with the resuscitated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) declared a final push on the insurgents. Successes were recorded from number of flash points in Alagarno, Tumbun Gini, Tumbun Dorina, Banki, Damasak and the Sambisa enclaves where several insurgents were dislodged and many of them surrendered.<sup>20</sup>

However, the security operatives spear-headed by the military were negatively affected by the Boko Haram crisis. In the process of Boko Haram adventure, several military bases and police stations and outposts, army and police barracks were devastated by the insurgents.<sup>21</sup> For instance, Kur Mohammed Barrack in Bama was overrun; Monguno military formation was smashed; Air

Force Base Maiduguri was attacked; Giwa Barrack was burgled; Mobile Police Training Base at Limankara in Gwoza Local Government was destroyed and hosts of Police stations across the state suffered attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents.<sup>22</sup> All these setbacks were as a result of prolonged unpreparedness, decay in professionalism which resulted, in occupational attitude and absence of knowledge of early warning sign. It further exposed the incapacity of the security operatives in gathering and sharing information and quick response. In essence, with such developments, it is hardly to believe that the security operatives or the military can contribute positively to the national social cohesion. For Janowitz Morris, had earlier observed that when the military had experience in suppressing internal crisis, it contributes positively to national social cohesion and development.<sup>23</sup> He further added that "successful internal operation can make the military more professional, and, all things being equal, successful operational experience leads to further military professionalism..."<sup>24</sup> However, when military and other professional security operatives losses some attributes of professionalism, they become occupational.<sup>25</sup>

Another negative consequence on the security operatives was the inherent lack of intra-service and inter-agency synergy in the counter terrorism operation is largely as a result of absence of social cohesion and the declining discipline and *esprit de'corp* among different security operatives deployed to the state. For instance, the military look down upon other security agents and sometimes; intelligence reports generated by Department of State Security Service (DSS) were often ignored or subjected to unwarranted scrutiny. Undoubtedly, this underscores and smeared effective counter terrorism operation not only in developing countries like ours but even in the developed countries.<sup>26</sup>

At the peak of the insurgency, the security operatives of the JTF effort to win the war on insurgency was fruitless. This forced the people of Borno State to device community based counter insurgency initiatives. In the first place, concerned people of Borno which include the government officials, traditional rulers and religious leaders among others took a unanimous position to take-up the holy Qur'an against the

<sup>15</sup>Tamuno, *Stakeholders at...* p. 158.

<sup>16</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military officers in at Maimalari Barracks, Monguno and Gibson Jalo Cantonment, Yola between 27<sup>th</sup> December 2016 and 30<sup>th</sup> January 2017. For the names of personalities interviewed see fn. 27, p.

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<sup>17</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>18</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>19</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>20</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>21</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>22</sup> Field notes: interviews with top military...

<sup>23</sup> Janowitz Morris, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963, p. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Morris, *The Military in the Political...* p. 36.

<sup>25</sup> Bayo Joel Adekanye (Adekson), *Military Occupation and Social Stratification in Nigeria*, Inaugural Lecture at University of Ibadan, Ibadan: UIP, 1993, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Morris, *The Military in the Political...* P. p. 67-8.



perpetrators of the insurgency in the state.<sup>27</sup> Prayers were intensified by religious leaders for peace to be restored in the state. In addition to this, non-state security actors initiative was launched to counter the insurgency. This resulted to the emergence of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 2013.<sup>28</sup> The emergence of CJTF facilitated the counter insurgency effort immensely. Almost all the local governments in Borno State have initiated the CJTF who worked side by side with the security operatives in most of their operations.<sup>29</sup>

#### **The Fate of the 2011 and 2015 General Elections:**

The intensity of the Boko Haram activities in Borno affected party-politics and electoral process. Because of the sect's hatred for the former Governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff, they targeted all politicians who shared political ideals with the governor and his political party, All Nigeria Peoples' Party (ANPP). Paradoxically however, it was politicized that the sect members literally pinched camp with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), at that time. During the 2011 general elections, fear was instilled among electorates who have solidarity with the ANPP. This little fear culminated into a great casualty with the woeful failure of Ali Modu Sheriff, a serving governor to clinch Borno Central Senatorial seat. This casualty followed suit with all contestants under ANPP within Maiduguri Metropolis, Jere, and Bama Local Governments losing their seats to the PDP. Despite the acrimony meted out for ANPP, it was able to win the gubernatorial seat and formed government.

Despite losing gubernatorial seat to the ANPP, politicians and chieftains of the PDP continued vociferous clamour for unseating the ANPP led government by every means. This was evident by their outcry for the imposition of the state of emergency on Borno State in 2011, so as to them, the Federal

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<sup>27</sup> During the interviews with traditional rulers, religious and political leaders and top brass of the military such as HRH The Shehu of Borno, HRH Lamido of Adamawa, HE the Executive Governor of Adamawa, Brig. Gen T. A. Lagbaja, Brig. Gen B. A. Akinroluyo, Sheikh Dr Ali Abubakar Mustapha and Rev. Father Oliver Dashi Doeme among others who have unanimously concurred that the insurgents' acts were far from being religious. The views of these personalities were obtained during interviews between 27<sup>th</sup> December 2016 and 30<sup>th</sup> January 2017. However, the taken up of the holy Quar'an is the ultimate spiritual method known to Borno in curving menace of whatever type. It is the last resort when all efforts at suppressing impending societal problems failed. Indeed, it worked perfectly.

<sup>28</sup> For details on Civilian Joint Task Force, see Garba, "The Role of Civilian Joint Task Force..."

<sup>29</sup> Garba, "The Role of Civilian Joint Task Force...for details.

Government can decisively deal with the problem of insurgency. In retrospect to this, the ANPP rejected the call for the declaration of emergency in the state. Its' national chairman, Dr Ogbonnaya Onu, on 18<sup>th</sup> July, 2011, publicly expressed discomfort with the mass exodus of people from several parts of the state, more especially from Maiduguri, its troubled capital city. He pleaded, "As a political party committed to the principles of peace and consensus building, we wish to point out that the Boko Haram crisis cannot be solved through law enforcement alone. We need to do more..... we believe, if carried out methodologically and with sincerity of purpose, will arm the Federal Government with the appropriate strategy with which to find a permanent solution to the problem".<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, the 2015 general elections in Borno produced a different scenario. Electoral pattern in the state changed dramatically as electorates and the general public posed a critical look at the performance of the Federal Government viz-a-viz counter terrorism effort. The period between 2014 and 2015 climaxed the tempo of Boko Haram attacks in the state, overrunning about 21 local government areas in the state. The ferocity of the conflict precipitated in mass exodus of people from their settlements that are vulnerable to attack by the insurgents to safer areas. Most people infiltrated into Maiduguri Metropolis and some areas in Jere and Konduga that had relative security guarantee. As a result, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps were established by local and state governments. As people were dislodged by the Boko Haram insurgents, they became disenchanted with the Federal Government and President Goodluck Jonathan's administration. Thus, when the 2015 general elections came, people vehemently expressed their lack of support for the former government and voted overwhelmingly to the All Progressive Congress candidates with Muhammadu Buhari triumphantly winning the presidential election.<sup>31</sup> Analytically, the Boko Haram phenomenon played a critical role in determining the result of the 2015 general elections.

#### **Social Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency**

The tragic years of the Boko Haram campaign in Borno had grievous social consequences on the state. The dastardly Boko Haram campaign seriously affected the social wellbeing of the people of Borno State in aspects of education, religious, interpersonal and societal relations, cultural practices and demography among others. In fact the level of setbacks caused by the insurgency cannot be estimated.

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<sup>30</sup> Tamuno, *Stakeholders at...* P. p. 206-7.

<sup>31</sup> The APC of Muhammadu Buhari's votes stood at 437,543 while the of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan PDP polled 25, 640 as announced by INEC as the presidential result polled between the two parties in Borno State.

**Effects on Education Sector:** Since the Boko Haram doctrine premised on western education is sin or forbidden, as such, educational institutions, school managers, pupils and students were the soft-targets of the insurgents. Many schools from basic education level, secondary and tertiary institutions were ravaged. Records have it that 512 schools on the side of basic education with 1,129 blocks and 2,346 classrooms<sup>32</sup>, 28 secondary schools<sup>33</sup> and two tertiary institutions suffered destructions of different magnitude and intensity.<sup>34</sup> Alongside, instructional materials, water points and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities were destroyed by the insurgents. School managers of different cadres were also victim. Worst hit were teachers where 474 teachers of basic education across the state were either lynched or missing.<sup>35</sup> In the secondary school level, 85 teachers were lost to the inferno.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, the tertiary institutions had their share of loses. For instance, Borno State College of Education Science and Technical Bama alone lost 32 lecturers,<sup>37</sup> College of Administrative Studies Konduga also lost 6 lecturers,<sup>38</sup> Ramat Polytechnic Maiduguri lost 3 lecturers;<sup>39</sup> Mohamet Lawan College of Agriculture Maiduguri lost 1 lecturer<sup>40</sup> while University of Maiduguri lost 7 lecturers.<sup>41</sup> However, as to the number of pupils and students, there is no credible data that authentically determine the number of those killed or missing. But one thing is certain that several of the pupils and students must have migrated to the neighboring countries such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger with their parents or unaccompanied as refugees.

<sup>32</sup>Borno, SUBEB, Education Management Information Service Survey, 2017.

<sup>33</sup>Alhaji Abba Yarema Habib, 57, Director Schools, Borno State Ministry of Education at Borno State Universal Basic Education Commission on 28/01/2018.

<sup>34</sup>Ahmed Jaha, 48, Hon. Commissioner for Higher Education, Borno State at Borno State Universal Basic Education Commission on 28/01/2018.

<sup>35</sup>Bulama Abiso, 55, Chairman, Borno State National Union of Teachers' at Borno State Universal Basic Education Commission on 28/01/2018.

<sup>36</sup>Bulama Abiso...

<sup>37</sup>Ahmed Jaha...

<sup>38</sup>Mohammed Shettima Daluma, Provost, Borno State College of Administrative Studies, Konduga at SUBEB on 29/01/2018.

<sup>39</sup>Interview with Malam Auwalu Waziri, a lecturer at Ramat Polytechnic Maiduguri at Mairi Ward, Jere Local Government Area on 30/01/2018.

<sup>40</sup>Ba'Mala, 56, Asst. Registrar, Mohamet Lawan College of Agriculture, Borno State at Kashim Ibrahim College of Education, Maiduguri on 29/01/2018.

<sup>41</sup>Dr Dani Mamman, 54, ASU Chairman, University of Maiduguri Chapter at Borno State at Borno State Universal Basic Education Commission on 28/01/2018.

Similarly, a good number have scattered within the country as IDPs. As the situation worsened between 2013 and early part of 2015, public schools in parts of Borno Central and North Senatorial districts were closed down. The IDPs who were earlier settled in schools within Maiduguri Metropolis adversely affected teaching and learning in the state. Consequently, the prolonged closure of public schools provoked public outcry. Thus irked by this development, the Borno State Government had to constitute a High-Powered Committee for reopening of schools.

Following the reopening of schools, the most striking incident occurred, that was the "Chibok School Girls" abduction saga of 14<sup>th</sup> April, 2014. The Boko Haram insurgents invaded the Government Girls' Secondary School Chibok in the night and seized 276 school girls. But latter, 53 of the girls were able to escape from their abductors, thus making the number of the missing girls to 223. For now, about half of the abducted Chibok girls have been released.<sup>42</sup> The issue of "Chibok School Girls" could be seen as an international issue taking a different dimension that is politically inclined.

**Effects on the Health Sector:** In the health sector, the insurgency has caused serious injury. Statistics available indicates that 19 hospitals and health centers across the state were stormed.<sup>43</sup> The scale of destruction varied as some were totally razed down, while others were partially paralyzed. Although, no medical doctor was said to have been killed, some Para-medical personnel were either abducted or killed. Indeed, three of such personnel on polio vaccination mission to Dikwa, one of the strong hold of the Boko Haram insurgents were assassinated in February, 2013 while one was abducted.<sup>44</sup> In the middle of 2017, some nurses were abducted along Maiduguri Damboa road and to date were in captivity. Not only were the nurses abducted, the insurgents also went with sizeable number of drugs and other health equipment. To sum up all, 23 nurses and Para-medical personnel were killed, 5 were abducted while 4 were injured.<sup>45</sup>

**Effects on Religion:** In the sphere of religion, Muslim and Christian worshippers in their places of worship i.e. mosques and churches were attacked.<sup>46</sup> In 2013 for

<sup>42</sup>Yahi Chibok, 52, Business man, at INEC Office in Chibok on 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2019.

<sup>43</sup>Dr Haruna Mshelia, 61, Hon. Commissioner for Health, Borno State (phone interview) on 28/1/2018.

<sup>44</sup>Abba Kura Ali, 53, Coordinator EPI, PHCDA, Maiduguri Metropolitan Area on, at SUBEB on 30/01/2018.

<sup>45</sup>Bukar Alawo, 59, Permanent Secretary, Borno State Ministry of Health, Phone Interview on 29/1/2018.

<sup>46</sup>Before the attacks on mosques by the insurgents using IEDs, there were several gun attacks on mosques by the sect members across the state where many worshippers were assassinated during supplications.

instance, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded in central mosque in the premises of the Shehu of Borno's palace in Maiduguri where many worshippers including some courtiers of the Shehu of Borno were killed. The Shehu of Borno and the late Deputy Governor of Borno State, Alhaji Zanna Umar Mustapha narrowly escaped. In the words of the Shehu of Borno, "it has now clearly shown that the Boko Haram sect has declared a total war on everybody as me being attacked....<sup>47</sup>". Several worshipping places followed suit by experiencing IED explosions, notably among them was that of the University of Maiduguri staff quarter's mosque where a suicide bomber attacked and claimed the lives of a professor and three others on 16<sup>th</sup> January, 2017.<sup>48</sup> There were other pockets of IED explosions in many mosques across the state too numerous to mention. Churches were not left out in the attacks. The University of Maiduguri Chapel was once attacked by a suicide bomber in the same 2017.

With the attacks on Muslim and Christian worshippers by the Boko Haram, any critical observer would agree that the doctrine of the sect is far from being religious. This corresponds with the views of eminent personalities who concurred that Boko Haram activities has no religious inclination, but anchored on doctrinal interest.<sup>49</sup> This views can be justified given the fact that all those Islamic clerics who opposed to the ideology of the Boko Haram were subjected to suffer the agony of the sect. Thus, many of the Islamic scholars whom they viewed as their enemies were killed or forcefully sent into exile.<sup>50</sup> What appeared to be contradictory in the

<sup>47</sup>Shehu of Borno...

<sup>48</sup>Dani Mamman...

<sup>49</sup>See the unanimous views of traditional rulers, political leaders, religious leaders and top military brass cited above, fn. 27, p. 10.

<sup>50</sup> Prior to the Boko Haram insurgency some Islamic scholars and soothsayers enjoyed aura of inviolability, remoteness or sacredness but were dramatically ridiculed and demystified. Ali Banga who was believed to be impregnable was gunned down in his house at Mairi in 2014. Mai Bintu, Shettima Abba Chima, Shettima Malam Abba (Mai Jama'a) were butchered in Bama by the insurgents. Mallam Aja one of the juma'at Imams, Malam Umara, Goni Usman were all killed by the Boko Haram in Konduga. Virtually in all the local governments, renowned scholars of the above mentioned qualities were exterminated. What shocked people was the massacre of the Nigerian Civil war veteran, General Mamman Shuwa in 2015, though not a scholar but was seen as a well "cooked" and mystic figure. His killing sent a wave of warning and further exacerbated fear in the state. Most of the retired top members of the Nigerian armed forces departed Maiduguri to more secured places. We are grateful to Alhaji Modu Mbusube, 46 and Alhaji Gudusu, 65 for providing us with some information on Bama and Konduga respectively in an interview granted

Boko Haram ideology is in its theory, they hate western education, but in practice, none of the education, neither Islamic nor any other form of education received acceptance and recognition by them. Ironically, several Islamiyya and Qur'anic schools suffered gun boots of the insurgents. According to the Chairman, Borno State Islamiyya Schools Association, three schools were razed down by the insurgents in Maiduguri Metropolis.<sup>51</sup>

**Effects on Mutual Relationship and Communication:** Inter-personal societal relations were affected and afflicted in the course of the Boko Haram crisis. The state of emergency declared in Borno by the Federal Government and subsequent deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF) to curtail the excesses of the insurgents was abused. This is because the JTF created a lot of security hurdles in curbing the situation. Some of the measures adopted were invariably inter-personally inhibitive and counterproductive. For instance, public gatherings for naming, marriage, funeral ceremonies and communal efforts and to a large extent, prayers were restricted. The net result of this is that families were cut-off from relating with their lineages, decline in communal participation hindered children to know their relatives.

What appeared to be a final struck that dealt with the interpersonal relationship in Borno was the excommunication of the people. As part of security measures, the JTF directed the shutting down of all telecommunication networks. The pretext used for this measure was to avert coordinating activities of the insurgents in the state. Travelling by road and air became a serious problem in that the insurgents held sway of the roads that connect intra and intercity networks so also Maiduguri International Airport which was closed down since the second half of 2013 of up to 2014.<sup>52</sup>

**Effects on Culture:** Culture as a total way of life of people of a given society when appeared to be impracticable, it will smear or perish out. The insurgency prevented free practice and dissemination of cultural traits by way of instilling fear in people. People developed fear for attending cultural festivities and ceremonies because of seeming vulnerability associated with festive areas. In fact, festivities such as sallah

in Mairi Ward of Jere Local Government of Borno State on 22/02/2018.

<sup>51</sup>Mohammed Isa, 50, Chairman, Borno State Islamiyya Schools Association at Borno State Universal Basic Education Commission on 28/01/2018.

<sup>52</sup>HRH the Shehu of Borno lamented on the state of affairs in Borno during the period under review that led to the excommunication of the state. Despite all odds, he managed to take the bull by the horn to ensure that he fulfilled his obligations in attending to national issues by road.

celebrations, durbar, turbaning or coronation and Qur'anic graduation, etc. came to a standstill. Consequent upon this, traditional crafts and craftsmanship were also affected. Traditional trades such as blacksmithing, dyeing, tanning, and weaving etc witnessed setbacks. This phenomenon further aggravated societal underdevelopment and impoverishment.

Borno is known for varieties of entertainment associated with the culture of the people particularly Kanuri which is the dominant and the most historic ethnic group. Music is important in the entertainment industry. The industry can be classified into the royal and public performance. Sadly, however, the insurgency virtually destroyed the industry by inflicting heavy casualty on music practitioners. The Shehu of Borno, lamented that "people were killed any how irrespective of who they are...., they even killed my royal musicians".<sup>53</sup> The royal musicians killed by the insurgents include Malah Manna, Malah Kura, Ba'ana Mannabe, Shettima Sunusi, Malah Abdu Gangama, Ba'Tujja Gangama, Zanna Riwolama, Mohammed Ali Kirdibe and Kotere Gashina among others.<sup>54</sup> Victimization of musicians did not only affect the royal musicians, many public musicians were also killed. Some were forced to either renounce their occupation or go underground for the sect members considered singing, dancing, drumming, fluting and piping as abominable acts. This action by the Boko Haram negatively impacted the society as it deprived the younger generation from identifying and appreciating their cultural heritage which is an important ingredient in the value orientation and initiation of the people. It further retarded their initiatives and livelihood of the music practitioners.

**Effects on Demography:** The insurgency has introduced new demographic pattern as most areas were affected in Borno State. It is generally known that the insurgency created fear in people and communities as most areas became theatres of war and conflicts. In the early part of the crisis, Maiduguri Metropolis, some part of Jere, Mafa and Kunduga became epicenters of the insurrection. During this period, residents of these areas started to move out of their abodes to rural areas for safety.<sup>55</sup> As the situation became tensed, rural areas which hitherto enjoyed relative peace turned into abodes of turmoil. Hence, mass movement from rural areas into urban metropolis became eminent for safety

<sup>53</sup>Shehu of Borno...

<sup>54</sup>We are indebted to acknowledge Ba'Maji, 45, the son of the late Waziri of Borno, Waziri Shettima Bukar for providing us with the names of some among the court musicians that were exterminated by the insurgents.

<sup>55</sup> See S. B. Kullima and Abdullahi Garba, "Understanding the Dynamics of the Boko Haram Phenomenon" In: A. M. Ashafa and Hussaini Jibrin (ed.), *The Nigerian Army in a Democracy* ...

and tranquility. Thus, who could not leave the rural areas were either conscripted into the membership of the Boko Haram fighters or remain in captivity as human-shields and serfdom. This scenario of population movement made real rural-urban drift more than the hitherto stereotyped rural-urban migration for the purpose of white-collar-job. This population movement seems to have produced a new settlement paradigm which clearly shows that population in the rural areas massively declined while that of the urban areas geometrically increased in that most of the villages have been deserted and their inhabitants have become IDPs. However, it is pertinent to note that some urban areas such as Bama, Gwoza, Damboa, Chibok, Monguno, Dikwa, Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Kukawa, Damasak, Mallamfatori, Guzamala, Abadam, Askira/Uba, Konduga and Mafa towns became war turned areas.<sup>56</sup> It is also noteworthy that the extent of carnage and destructions inflicted on populace and settlements were so enormous that some settlements might not resettle again. It could be viewed that only those villages that are economically endowed or viable that could re-emerge. More so, some of the populace might not go back to their original homelands as they have established themselves in the host communities.

Consequent upon disintegration and dislocation of the rural settlements, the massive influx of people into the Metropolis cannot be contained by the existing residences. Thus, Borno State Government has to provide alternative camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). As a result of this, completed and uncompleted government residential quarters and schools turned into IDP camps. These new settlements in camps witnesses attendant consequences of population density such as overcrowding, health hazard, theft, raping, scavenging, poor sanitary condition, unwanted pregnancies, frequent marriages and divorces among other unwanted happenings and behaviors.

Another concomitant effect of the insurgency was the massive lost of lives of people. Many people beyond estimation were killed in Borno State. The killings were in three stands; by the insurgents, the JTF and those who died in the process of migration. The security operatives of the JTF claimed the lives of many people who were innocent especially during the pre-Operation Lafiya Dole. However, it could be assumed that many especially those who were used as human-shields died as collateral damages. Some people died in their attempt to flee the wrath of the Boko Haram following the capture of their towns by the insurgents. Some were mercilessly massacred by the Boko Haram in places like Bama, Gwoza, Baga, Marte, Kirenowa and

<sup>56</sup> To cushion the effects of the destruction caused by the Boko Haram insurgency across the state, the Borno State Government established the Ministry for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement in 2015.



Damasak. In retrospect, on the side of the JTF, there were scores of killings within Maiduguri in areas such as Kawar Maila, Budum, Zajiri, Umarari, Kaleri, London-Ciki, Kalari, Ruwanzafi, particularly between 2012 and 2013. Mistakenly, stray bullets have killed and injured many people. Pathetically also, the mishap of the air-drop on IDPs in their camp in Kala-Balge in January, 2017 led to the death of many people. The mortality rate in the state engulfed people into an unprecedented situation resulting into high number of widows and orphans. Statistics available to government have it that there are 50,014 widows and 52,611 orphans in the state.<sup>57</sup>

**Emergence of Humanitarian Agencies:** The general destruction and carnage experienced in Borno resulted in serious humanitarian crisis which required response, both locally and internationally. Thus, humanitarian agencies such as UNICEF, MSF, WHO, ICRC, IOM, UNHRC, USAID, Plan International, Rescue Committee, Norwegian Government, etc and several local NGOs sprouted into the state. Indeed, records show that there are 217 NGOs that registered their presence in Borno State for Humanitarian assistance.<sup>58</sup> At this juncture, the NGOs and INGOs intervened in different sectors for the purpose of reconstruction and recovery process such as education, resettlement, reconstruction, health, WASH, capacity building, healing process in form of Psycho-Social Support (PSS) and nutrition etc. Although the NGOs and INGOs interventions were laudable, many observers of events in the state flawed the activities and approaches of some of them. Some people believed that the NGOs served as channels for elongation of the conflict. As such, they see them as playing double standard, while others came with disguised motives. Some of the NGOs falsely used pictures of events in other places or parts of the world to portray the situation in Borno for their personal gains.<sup>59</sup> No one better described the recent activities of some NGOs than the former Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, who in the 29<sup>th</sup> African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia said that "...the Imperialists are now coming into Africa in a different form, this time, through the NGOs". To make things difficult for the people of Borno, they virtually rented all the existing hotels, apartments and hired operational vehicles exorbitantly for the period of two to five years as if the conflict will never end. This makes things especially rented houses unaffordable for the common men who were already economically overstretched and strangled by the activities of the insurgents in the state.

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<sup>57</sup> Engr. Ahmed Satomi, 39, Chairman, Borno State Emergency Management Agency, Phone Interview on 30/01/2018.

<sup>58</sup> Bulama Mali Gubio, 70, Retiree, Borno State Elder Statesman in his residence on 2/02/2016.

<sup>59</sup> See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Baltimore: Penguin, 1968, P. p. 119 & 402.

## Conclusion

The Boko Haram insurgency had undoubtedly unleashed terror of worst kind in the lives of the people of Borno State. Several lives were lost, private and public properties were destroyed. Political and social institutions were devastated and the extent of damage on such institutions was so grievous that almost taken Borno back to about 50 years. Combination of absence of intra and inter agency synergy on the part of the armed forces and the Para-military units who were saddled with the responsibility of fighting the insurgents was partly responsible for aggravating tension in the state. Again, the armed forces and other security operatives were at the first time exposed to the approach of internal warfare which is entirely different from conventional warfare that they were trained for. This might probably be responsible for their inability to professionally deal with the situation adequately in the first instance. The conflict opened the horizon of the Bornoans in aspect of community policing which was applauded world over, hence, the emergence of CJTF was a child of necessity. Although they were sharply criticized for being extrajudicial in their approaches in some quarters, they nonetheless performed creditably well in quenching the dastardly acts of the insurgents in the state. The crisis seriously affected traditional industries and traditional initiatives by way of exterminating the artisans and craftsmen. Inter-personal relations amongst people virtually disappeared and cultural values eroded. Religious areas or places of worship became suspicious and mistrusted. The eight years of crisis in Borno attracted humanitarian response where hundreds of NGOs both local and international thronged into Borno State.